Standing-Based End-of-Life Ethics

Summary

Standing-based end-of-life ethics applies Standing and Answerability Ethics to decisions about the ending and continuation of a person's life. The framework's first rule is the same one it uses elsewhere: no outside party may render the life-verdict. Whether a life remains worth its costs to the one living it is a judgment belonging to that person, not to family, state, clinician, institution, public cost, or philosophical doctrine.

The result is symmetrical. A capable person's rendered verdict about their own continuation cannot be replaced by an external better-off-alive verdict enforced through their body. It also cannot be replaced by an external better-off-dead verdict imposed on disabled, dependent, costly, demented, incarcerated, or otherwise vulnerable people. The framework therefore combines jurisdiction over one's own continuation with a strict refusal of quality-of-life verdicts by others.

Claim status: derived argument with stated bridge premises. It depends on Settlement's exercise analysis of the life-verdict, on extending Standing-Based Reproductive Ethics's bodily-jurisdiction logic from reproductive capacities to the body generally, on the freedom condition at Authorization, on Labor Under Engineered Necessity, and on Performed Exercises and the Dead. Clinical, legal, and safeguard design remain outside the page.

The jurisdiction claim

Settlement reserves one verdict absolutely: the whole-life verdict belongs to the person whose life it is. That reservation applies at the end of life as well as at the beginning.

Compelling a capable person's life to continue against their rendered verdict enters a verdict for them and enforces it through their body. On the framework's terms, this is a form of jurisdiction: a standard imposed over the person's body that answers to some authority other than the person whose life is at issue.

The framework therefore separates two questions:

This is a philosophical jurisdiction claim, not a legal procedure or clinical standard.

The symmetric protection

The same reservation blocks external better-off-dead verdicts. No one may decide that another person's life is not worth continuing because the person is disabled, dependent, costly, old, cognitively changed, socially burdensome, or predicted to suffer.

Such judgments repeat the structure the framework rejects in eugenic reasoning: a public or third-party ranking of lives from outside the life. Arrangements and Lives says the framework has no machinery for issuing that verdict, favorably or unfavorably.

The protection is symmetrical because the verdict is one exercise with one holder. It is available to the person whose life it is, and to no one else.

Directives and stewardship

Advance directives and other prior exercises are governed by Performed Exercises and the Dead. A directive made by an existing, capable, free person is a performed exercise. Later incapacity or death prevents new exercises; it does not unperform the old one.

Stewardship fills only the space that Authorization gives it. A proxy may preserve the ward's open account, apply the ward's performed exercises, and act under the ward's good where action must be taken. A proxy may not supply a whole-life verdict in the ward's name. Quality-of-life closure by another person is a counterfeit exercise.

Engineered necessity

Exercises require freedom. A yes produced by necessity is a surrender, not a grant. This matters acutely at the end of life.

Where continuation has been made unlivable by untreated pain, unaffordable care, institutional abandonment, isolation, coercive family arrangements, or the pricing of dependence as burden, a choice to die may record the conditions imposed rather than a free exercise. The framework's institutional demand is therefore provision before facilitation: arrangements must be answerable for making continuation livable enough that an ending, where chosen, is not a priced exit.

This condition judges arrangements. It does not reinstate jurisdiction over the person. A state, institution, family, or doctrine that uses the freedom problem to override the person's rendered verdict has converted a test of the arrangement into a tribunal over the someone.

No conscription of others

Jurisdiction over one's own ending creates no title to another person's body, conscience, profession, or labor. A clinician, relative, or caregiver is also a someone, not material for another's project. Claims about access therefore run against arrangements rather than against particular unwilling persons.

The framework's shape is familiar from other pages: the claim may be real, but the implementation may not possess someone else.

Limits

Related pages

Settlement · Standing · Authorization · Performed Exercises and the Dead · Standing-Based Reproductive Ethics · Labor Under Engineered Necessity · Arrangements and Lives · Conflicts Among Standing Parties · Open Questions


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